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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the applicability of the theory of optimum 
currency area to the pegged exchange rate regime between 
Bhutan and India. Most of the optimum currency criteria hold 
true for Bhutan and India. The paper then analyzes the 
implications of establishing a free-floating exchange rate. It 
outlines the negative consequences and concludes that the 
present system is optimal. Any attempt to deviate from it will 
cause economic uncertainties.  
 
Introduction 
 
The financial sector in Bhutan has begun to develop only 
recently. Bhutan remained closed to the rest of the world till 
the early 1960s. Until then, there was limited barter trade 
with India and Tibet. Most internal transactions took the form 
of barter. Although some historical documents mention the 
use of coins in Bhutan during the pre-modern period, studies 
have shown that apart from the coins minted in Bhutan, 
Indian and Tibetan coins were in circulation. However, barter 
trade was predominant.  
 
Even after it opened to the outside world in 1961, Bhutan did 
not have its own banknotes, but transactions were no longer 
confined to barter. India provided both financial and technical 
assistance to initiate development activities. Through this 
assistance, Indian rupees began to circulate in Bhutan. The 
rupee has been legal tender in Bhutan since then 1. The use 
                                          
*Researcher, The Centre for Bhutan Studies, Thimphu 
1 For detailed information on coinage and monetization of Bhutanese 
economy, read “Coinage in Bhutan” in Journal of Bhutan Studies, 
Vol.1, No. 1 (Autumn, 1999) and  “Monetisation of Bhutan” in 
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of money increased with the progress in development 
activities. A Secretariat of Finance was established in order to 
facilitate the flow of cash in the country. It was upgraded to a 
Ministry of Finance in 1968. In that same year, the Bank of 
Bhutan, which was the first commercial bank, was 
established. The Bhutanese banknote called Ngultrum [Nu.) 
was introduced in 1974. In 1975, the Royal Insurance 
Corporation of Bhutan was established2 as the first non-bank 
financial institution. Developments continued apace.  In 1982 
the government passed an act that established the Royal 
Monetary Authority as the country’s central bank. In 1988, 
the Bhutan Development Finance Corporation was 
established, and in 1993 a capital market came into existence 
with the opening of the Royal Securities Exchange. The 
Bhutan National Bank, the first private bank in the country 
was opened in 1996.  
 
Exchange Rate and Dual Monetary System 
 
Since the introduction of the Ngultrum, the Bhutanese 
government has pegged it at par with the Indian Rupee. 
Bhutanese currency has no independent exchange rate vis-à-
vis other major currencies of the world. The Nugultrum’s 
exchange rate vis-à-vis some prominent currencies such as 
the USD or Euro is replicated from the rupee’s rate against 
these currencies. The peg is not an irrevocable one. The 
Bhutanese government can withdraw from it at any time in 
favor of its own independent floating exchange rate. It can 
also decide to peg the Ngultrum to some other currency. This 
has not happened till now and the exchange regime with 
India has been maintained for almost thirty years. Another 
important characteristic of Bhutan’s financial sector is the 
circulation of two currencies. In addition to pegging its 
currency to the rupee, Bhutan allows free circulation of the 
                                                                                       
Journal of Bhutan Studies, Vol.2, No. 2 (Winter, 2000), both by 
Nicholas Rhodes. 
2 It was mandated with the task of carrying out all forms of 
insurance business, undertaking commercial and development 
projects. 
Pegged Exchange Rate Regime Between Bhutan and India 
 117
rupee in Bhutan. Rupee is accepted as a legal tender. 
Bhutanese currency is also accepted in those frontier regions 
of India that have major business transactions with Bhutan. 
However, it is not accepted in rest of India. Bhutanese do not 
prefer one currency to the other; Ngultrum and Rupee are 
equally preferred. While it is hard to provide an accurate 
estimate, it can be assumed that the volume of rupees that 
circulate in Bhutan is much lower than Ngultrum. Therefore, 
in terms of circulation the rupee can be called a subsidiary 
currency.  
 
Was and Is Pegging a Good Policy for Bhutan? 
 
The crucial question is if this arrangement is beneficial to 
Bhutan. To answer this question, I will use the theory of 
optimum currency discussing some of the main economic 
characteristics of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) to see if 
Bhutan’s economic conditions satisfy them and therefore 
support its decision to establish and maintain a pegged 
exchange rate regime with India.  
 
In his seminal article3 on optimum currency theory (1961), 
Robert Mundell defines the optimal currency area as a 
domain within which exchange rates are fixed. His idea of 
optimum currency theory rests on the existence of a high 
degree of mobility of factors between countries and regions 
and between those that experience symmetric shocks from 
outside shocks such as oil crisis.  
 
Factor Mobility 
 
Free cross-border flow of labor between the countries enables 
them to smooth out unemployment problems and equalizes 
wages in different countries and regions. Countries that have 
free movement of labor between them offer best 
                                          
3 For those readers interested in the article, it is entitled “A Theory of 
Optimum Currency Areas” which was published in The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Sep. 1961), pp. 657-665. 
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circumstances for fixed exchange rates or for currency 
unions. There is no need to use exchange rate adjustment or 
other monetary instruments to address the problem of 
unemployment. Indian workers in Bhutan are required to get 
Bhutanese work permits. Regulations limiting the duration of 
employment and the number of Indian workers that 
Bhutanese firms can hire are strictly enforced. Given these 
facts, one would tend to think that the mobility of labor 
between Bhutan and India is limited. However, because the 
size of the Bhutanese workforce is very small, a large number 
of Indians are hired to work in Bhutan. The presence of so 
large a number of Indian workers is an indication that there 
is some mobility of labor4, although the number would be 
even larger had it not been for these restrictions. Bhutanese 
workers, on the other hand can move freely in India5. Thus, 
the mobility factor as a determinant for having fixed exchange 
rate holds only partially true for Bhutan.   
 
Trade Integration 
 
A country with a high geographic concentration of its 
international trade will find it convenient to use a common 
currency in its transactions with its trading partner. This will 
reduce transaction costs. This criterion also validates 
Bhutan’s decision to peg its exchange rate to the Indian rupee 
and to allow the circulation of Indian currency within 
Bhutan’s boundaries. As is obvious from the chart below, 
over 90% of Bhutan’s exports go to India and about 70% of its 
imports come from there. The upper panel of the chart shows 
the split in Bhutan’s exports between India and rest of the 
world. The lower panel shows their relative in Bhutan’s 
imports.  
 
                                          
4 No official statistics were accessible at the time of writing this 
paper but I would estimate that over 50,000 Indians (close to 7% of 
Bhutan’s population) work in Bhutan. 
5There is no empirical evidence to support this. Because the 
workforce is so small and the work opportunities are better in 
Bhutan, Bhutanese rarely go to India to find jobs. 
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Figure 2: Bhutan’s Exports and Imports from India and rest of 
the world 
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Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF, 2001 
 
Symmetric Shocks 
 
Countries are said to experience symmetric shocks if external 
changes like a sharp fall in the supply of oil or other 
economic goods affect all the countries in a similar way. For 
example, a sharp fall in the supply of oil could cause a 
decline in the outputs of various countries in a particular 
region. Countries facing symmetric shocks make better 
candidates for an optimum currency area and tend to have 
pegged or fixed exchange rates. When shocks are highly 
correlated, a depreciation of one country’s currency against 
the other will not be effective in stabilizing outputs. Since 
both are experiencing the same shock, both will be induced to 
devalue and, as they are devaluing at the same time, neither 
of them would succeed in changing the relative prices of its 
own goods to make them more competitive in the market. 
 
In order to see if these arguments hold true for Bhutan and 
India, I have chosen output growth for some years before and 
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after 1991 for analysis.  In 1991, India experienced a balance 
of payments crisis. Its whole economy suffered from sluggish 
growth. A host of factors, including its own past policies were 
held responsible, but the crisis was triggered mainly by the oil 
shock of 1991. We see in figure 3 that Bhutan and India 
experienced a symmetric shock. Both experienced a sharp 
decline in growth of output in 1991 followed a largely similar 
upward trend thereafter. There is a high degree of correlation 
between the business cycles of both countries. Thus, 
prevalence of symmetric shock as a criterion for establishing 
fixed exchange rate is valid for Bhutan.   
 
Figure 3: GDP growth rates for Bhutan and India  
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Source: International Finance Statistics, IMF, 2001 
 
The Size and Openness of the Country 
 
Following Mundell’s article, Mckinnon (1963) proposed the 
size of a country and its openness as one of the main factors 
that facilitate formation of an optimum currency area. A small 
country is supposed to derive more utility from its currency if 
it is linked to some other major currency through a fixed 
exchange rate system. He also put forward the view that the 
more open a country, the more likely a candidate the country 
Pegged Exchange Rate Regime Between Bhutan and India 
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is for an optimum currency area. He defines openness as a 
ratio of tradable goods to non-tradable goods. An economy 
with a higher ratio of tradable to non-tradable goods is 
considered more open. Economies that are highly open prefer 
fixed exchange rates. For them, a change in exchange rates 
will not be accompanied by any significant changes in the real 
competitiveness of the economy. Such small economies have 
very little or no influence at all in international trade. 
Exchange rate changes will not be accompanied by changes 
in the prices of its tradable goods. Therefore, manipulation of 
exchange rates will only cause fluctuations in domestic prices 
and will have no impact on the international competitiveness 
of the economy. Improvement in the trade balance for small 
economies can only be achieved by lowering domestic 
expenditures while maintaining the same level of outputs.  
 
According to this criterion, Bhutan’s decision to peg its 
currency to the rupee is valid. An economy is normally 
considered small when its influence in international trade is 
very insignificant. Bhutan’s influence in international trade is 
obviously small or nonexistent. I have validated this idea of 
“small and open economy” by comparing Bhutan with its 
main trading partner, India. I have used Stanoeva’s idea of 
smallness.6  She measures the relative size of country i 
(Bhutan in my case) to country j (India) as their GDP ratio at 
constant price. But I have used the subscripts b and i, for 
Bhutan and India, respectively. I have used the GDP at factor 
cost in place of GDP at constant price7. I have chosen 1995 as 
the year of comparison as during this year both the 
economies grew at a rate of over 7% and experienced an 
inflation of around 10%. The ratio is very small, as seen 
below8. 
 
SIZEbi = GDPtb/GDPti 
                                          
6 http://sceco.univ-aix.fr/cefi/colloques/stanoeva.pdf 
7 The GDP figures at constant prices were not readily available. GDP 
figures cited above are from International Financial Statistics, IMF, 
2001. 
8 The GDP figures are in millions of rupees. 
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SIZEij = 9610.60/10732700 = 0.00089 (0.09%) 
 
For openness, I have chosen the ratio of Bhutan’s total trade 
values (i.e. exports plus imports) to its GDP for the period 
1990-99. The ratio is significantly large throughout the period 
confirming that Bhutan is a highly open economy. This 
further validates the optimality of the decision that Bhutan 
has taken to peg its currency.   
 
Figure 1: Trade-GDP Ratio 
62
77
92
77
72
82 80 78 80 80 78
0
25
50
75
100
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
Pe
rc
en
t
 
Source: Compiled from IMF Financial Statistics, 2001 
 
Degree of Product Diversification 
 
Highly diversified economies make better candidates for 
currency areas than less diversified economies. Diversification 
provides some insulation against a variety of shocks, thereby 
not necessitating frequent changes in exchange rates to 
stabilize the swings in economy arising out of different 
macroeconomic shocks (pp. 49, Kenen, 1969). Bhutan is not 
a diversified economy. Agriculture continues to be the 
dominant sector at over 38%9 of its gross domestic product. 
                                          
9 World Development Report, 2000 
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Over 80% of the population depends on agriculture for 
employment. However, the export market is dominated by the 
energy sector. In 1999, electricity constituted over 41% of 
Bhutan’s total exports (Bhutan Trade Statistics, 2000). Given 
these facts, one can conclude that Bhutan is not a diversified 
economy. Therefore, Bhutan’s decision to peg its currency to 
the Indian rupee is not valid according to this particular 
criterion. 
 
Fiscal Integration 
 
A higher level of fiscal integration between countries enables 
them to weather shocks through endogenous fiscal transfers 
from a low unemployment to a high unemployment region 
(Kenen, 1969). Such fiscal integration reduces the cost of 
fixed exchange rates. This criterion needs some qualification 
in the case of Bhutan. The country’s fiscal policy is linked to 
that of India’s only in the sense that many development 
activities in Bhutan are executed with assistance from India. 
When that assistance is not available on time, Bhutan faces 
some fiscal problems and undertakes some prudent deficit 
financing. Apart from this, Bhutanese and Indian fiscal 
policies are totally disconnected from each other. For 
instance, neither India nor Bhutan makes any fiscal transfers 
for unemployment problems prevailing in the other. Thus, 
fiscal integration as a criterion for the pegging of the 
Ngultrum to the rupee is not valid for Bhutan.   
 
Most, but not all of the economic characteristics discussed in 
the theory of optimum currency areas appear to apply to the 
Bhutan-India case. Others require qualification. It can be 
concluded that the Bhutanese government’s decision to peg 
its currency to the Indian rupee and to allow the rupee to 
circulate in Bhutan is an optimal policy. However, a 
qualification to this conclusion needs to be made to drive 
home the point. It could be argued that the present analysis 
has been done after Bhutan and India are already in a 
currency union and that the economic characteristics 
discussed above are bound to prevail as a result of that 
 124
union. These characteristics might not necessarily have 
existed before 1974 when the peg was introduced. I would 
argue, however, that the fact that India exclusively financed 
Bhutan’s first two five-year plans and that Bhutan did not 
have much economic relationship with any other country at 
that time implies that the economic characteristics 
supporting a fixed exchange rate would have been in play 
much before 1974.  
 
Despite apparent advantages, there are also some costs 
associated with such an exchange rate regime. Bhutan does 
not have an independent monetary policy, suffers some 
seignorage losses10 and its political pride is undermined11. 
These costs may not necessarily be bad. The costs that 
Bhutan may have to bear if it were to have a free-floating 
exchange rate could be much more profound.  
 
A Floating Exchange Rate: Are there any Advantages for 
Bhutan? 
 
In addition to predominant economic concerns political 
considerations also play a role in the currency regimes in 
which countries adopt. Despite the theory of optimum 
currency areas, most countries seem to own their own 
currencies (Mussa, 1997, pp. 217). Political factors play an 
important role even in common currency areas. I will assume, 
for the sake of argument that the Bhutanese government is 
going to end the present exchange rate regime and disallow 
the circulation of Indian currency. It is going to have a free-
floating exchange rate of its own. This assumption will allow 
                                          
10 It would require the government to print more Ngultrums if there 
were no free circulation of rupees within Bhutan. The income, in the 
form of these new notes, would far exceed the cost of printing them. 
This income is known as Seignorage. So the free circulation of 
rupees causes some seignorage losses to the government.  
 
11 I have not discussed these costs at length, as they tend to be more 
or less same across geographical regions and a vast literature on this 
issue already exists.  
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us to discuss the potential negative impact of de-pegging the 
Ngutrum and the Rupee. 
 
In this case, Bhutan would have an independent exchange 
rate and negative effects of a pegged rate discussed above 
would disappear. Bhutan’s political pride would increase and 
it would be able to make its own monetary policies. It would 
be able to earn some revenue in terms of seignorage through 
the printing of more currency to replace the Indian notes that 
would stop circulating. While these would be positive 
consequences of a policy change, the new exchange regime 
could introduce a host of new costs and complications into 
the economy. 
 
India would continue to be Bhutan’s primary trading partner 
into the indefinite future. Since the rupee would no longer 
circulate freely in Bhutan, Bhutanese shoppers would be 
required to change currency every time they shopped in India. 
The transaction costs that would emerge could be very high. 
To the extent that it would be costly to use, a free-floating 
Bhutanese currency would fail to serve as a convenient 
medium of exchange. Hundreds of Bhutanese customers 
shopping in India would no longer be able shop using their 
own currency. Even if they were able to use the Ngultrum, the 
Indian shopkeepers would take uncertainties associated with 
the exchange rate into account and would always try to cover 
themselves by increasing prices to Bhutanese customers. The 
latter could suffer substantial welfare loss due to increased 
transaction costs or due to increased prices.  
 
If the liquidity value of a currency declines, domestic 
nationals attempt to accumulate foreign bank balances. This 
happens even if the marginal efficiency of investment within 
domestic boundaries is greater than outside (Mckinnon, 
1963, pp. 722). If the Bhutanese people face increasing 
transaction costs and other uncertainties from a free floating 
exchange rate, they would obviously find the liquidity value of 
the Ngultrum very low and might start opening accounts in 
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India. This could cause a flight of capital from the country, 
which in turn would lead to a decline in investments.  
 
Exchange rate uncertainties could also cause a decline in the 
flow of investments from abroad. This has not been a concern 
to the Bhutanese economy so far. Foreign direct investments 
did not exist at all. But now that the government has put in 
place a Foreign Direct Investment Act and we are trying to 
open the economy to foreign investors, exchange rate 
uncertainty should be one of the concerns of Bhutanese 
policy makers. Economic literature so far has focused on two 
issues: the impact of exchange rates on investment, and the 
impact of volatility or uncertainty in exchange rates on the 
flow of investments. There has been no consensus on either of 
these issues among economists. Some argue that depreciation 
of the host country currency increases foreign direct 
investment and others argue that appreciation of the host 
currency does the same12. Similarly, there is no consensus on 
the impact of volatility of exchange rates on the flow of 
investment. Cushman (1985) developed a model in which he 
demonstrated that increased volatility of foreign exchange 
rates caused an increase in the flow of foreign direct 
investment. He argued that during periods of exchange rate 
uncertainty, FDI is preferred to exports as the means of 
serving the foreign market. In other words, business 
organizations prefer FDI to export-related activities when the 
exchange rate is very volatile. But Campa (1993) pointed out 
that investors are concerned with future expected profits and 
they postpone their decision to enter or exit as the exchange 
rate becomes more volatile. He provided empirical proof of 
                                          
12 Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct Investment: An Imperfect 
Capital Markets Approach by Kenneth A. Froot and Jeremy C. Stein 
(in Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, Issue 4, Nov. 1991); 
Real Exchange Rate Risk, Expectations, and the Level of Direct 
Investment by David O. Cushman (in The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 67, Issue 2, May, 1985); and Entry by Foreign Firms 
in the United States Under Exchange Rate Uncertainty by Jose 
Manuel Campa (in The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 75, 
Issue 4, Nov., 1993)   
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this argument by showing decline in the flow of investment to 
the US in wholesale industries, particularly in those where 
sunk costs of entry were high. Thus, risk neutral firms are 
deterred from entering foreign markets in the presence of high 
levels of exchange uncertainty. This view suggests that if a 
free floating Bhutanese exchange rate turns out to be very 
volatile, potential foreign investors would be deterred from 
investing in Bhutan. In that event, our policy of inviting 
foreign investment into Bhutan would fail and the overall 
economic development of the country could suffer.  
 
Kenen and Rodrik find that one of the effects of short-term 
volatility in real exchange rates is the depression of the 
volume of international trade. If Bhutan’s independent 
exchange rate were unstable, it would have an adverse impact 
on its international trade. There could also be other effects, 
perhaps more profound that might arise out of abolishing the 
currency union. Frankel and Rose conducted an empirical 
study of the effects of currency unions on trade and output. 
They found that a currency union increases trade by more 
than three times and does not cause any diversion of trade 
away from non-members (Frankel & Rose, 2000). They 
concluded that every unit of increased trade increases income 
per capita by more than 1/3 of a percent over a 20-year 
period and by a more significant amount over the longer run. 
They conclude that these two effects in turn have a major 
effect on output. In light of these arguments, it could be 
argued that Bhutan’s withdrawal from the present regime, 
which is, in effect, a currency union, will result in a decrease 
in trade, income and output, i.e., we would forego the best 
economic options available to us. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Bhutan’s economic characteristics seem to support the theory 
of optimum currency area. The current exchange rate regime 
is, therefore, an ideal policy for Bhutan. Any attempt to 
deviate from this policy could lead to economic complications. 
If an independent exchange rate is unstable, a series of 
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macroeconomic problems would arise, deterring investment 
and trade; ultimately this would slow the growth of the 
economy. Unless the Indian rupee becomes unstable, causing 
economic and political uncertainty in Bhutan, the country 
should continue to peg its currency to the rupee. Even in 
such a situation, given the high integration of trade with 
India, depegging would hardly immunize Bhutan from the 
effects of fluctuations in the Indian currency.  The current 
exchange rate regime appears to serve Bhutan’s interests 
well. 
 
____________________________________________________________ 
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